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Five Lessons from the Clean Air Act
Implementation
DAVID M. DRIESEN*

Introduction
Learning lessons from the Clean Air Act (CAA)1 imple-

mentation is important for at least two reasons. First, millions of people need the CAA to succeed in meeting its goals.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
sixty-two million Americans breathe air that is not safe.2
Polluted air causes at least 64,000 annual deaths,3 contributes to respiratory illness and asthma,4 increases risks of
cancer, 5 and may seriously threaten our neurological and reproductive health. 6 Dirty air damages crops, kills trees,
ruins lakes and streams, and impairs visibility, even from re* Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law; J.D. Yale Law
School (1989). Professor Driesen worked as a Senior Project attorney in the
Natural Resources Defense Council's Air and Energy Program prior to joining
the Syracuse faculty. His responsibilities involved monitoring implementation
of the Clean Air Act.
1. Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
2. See Elizabeth B. Thompson & Jayne E. Mardock, CleanAir at the Crossroads: ProgressMade and Challenges Ahead, CLEAN Am NETwoRK (NRDC,
Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1995, at 1.
3. This figure is very conservative. It reflects the number of deaths attributable solely to particulate pollution. See NATruAL RESouRcEs DEFENSE CoUmcm, BREATH-TAmNG: PREMATURE MORTALrrY DUE TO PARTCULATE Am
POLLUTION iN 239 AlucAN CrrJEs (1996).
4. See 11 RcHARw R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY I 865.5A at
79A-299 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1994) (hereinafter POWELL). This paragraph in
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY was revised by David Driesen. See id. at 79A-271;
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN URBAN AND

REGIONAL Am PoLLUTION 31-38 (1991).
5. See POWELL, supra note 4, 91865.5A[4], at 79A-321.
6. See generally THEO CoLBURN ET AL., OuR STOLEN FUtuRr

(1996); H.R.

REP. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 154 (1990).
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mote mountaintops. 7 We must learn lessons from the CAA
implementation to make sure that we realize the CAA's goals
of protecting the environment and public health.
Second, the CAA implementation provides lessons in regulatory policies that have relevance for other statutory
schemes, especially for other environmental statutes. The
CAA Amendments of 1990 (CAAA),8 use an enormous variety
of regulatory approaches to address the ubiquitous and
many-faceted problems of air pollution. Ask almost any question about regulatory policy and chances are, experience with
the CAA will be helpful in answering the question. Should
Congress set emission limitations? Should Congress delegate
that task to the EPA or should the states set these limitations? The CAA uses all three approaches: (1) congressional
emission limitations for mobile sources (such as cars) 9 and
large power plants which emit sulfur dioxide, causing acid
rain,10 (2) EPA set emission limitations for hazardous air
emissions from stationary sources (such as factories),"1 and
(3) state emission limitations addressing urban smog. 12 How
should we go about limiting emissions? The CAA does so by
employing' 3 technology based standards,' 4 health based
6
standards,' 5 and emissions trading.'
Drawing lessons from the CAA implementation requires
some caveats. First, although the 1990 CAAA provide for
substantial pollution reduction by 1995,17 the CAA requires
7. See POwELL, supra note 4, 865.5A[2][e][ii],[5], at 79A-299; Graig N.
Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control Compelling Versus Site
Shifting, 74 IoWA L. REv. 1 (1988).
8. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA), Pub.L. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399 (1990).

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See CAA § 202(g)-(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(g)-(h).
See id. § 404 42 U.S.C. § 7651c.
See id. § 121, 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
See id. §§ 72(c)(1), 182(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(c)(1), 7511a(b)(2).
See POWELL, supra note 4, 1 865.5A[9][c], at 79A-330.20(18).
See, e.g., CAA § 112(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).
See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125 (D.C.

Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f).

16. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 4, 865.5A[5], at 79A-329.
17. See, e.g., CAA 88 112(e)(1), 182, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(e)(1), 7511a.
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reductions through the year 2010,18 so the lessons we draw
must be tentative. Second, since we lack good emissions
monitoring data in many instances, we cannot precisely measure the success of implemented programs. We can, however,
distinguish between programs that are being carried out as
designed and programs that are floundering. In addition, we
do have some monitoring of pollution levels for some pollutants. Third, a large variety of factors influence implementation including congressional and presidential politics, actions
of both polluters and environmentalists, funding levels for
government agencies with implementation responsibilities,
the weather, and last (and at times, least) the law. This
makes learning lessons complicated.
Below, I draw five lessons from our implementation experience to date.
Lesson One: When Congress Makes Detailed
Decisions to Reduce Emissions, We Get
Progress
The CAA's most successful programs, the program to
phase-out ozone depleting chemicals, the program to limit
sulfur dioxide emissions from acid rain, and the program to
limit mobile source emissions, all feature detailed congressionally set emissions limitations. 19 These programs use a variety of approaches: a phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals,
emissions trading of sulfur dioxide allowances, and straightforward limitations on tailpipe emissions. Regardless of
which approach is used, in every case where Congress has
established emissions limitations, these limitations generate
substantial reductions in pollution.
By contrast, the CAA's program to limit hazardous air
pollution delegates the authority to set emissions limitations
to the EPA.2o This program has had only modest success,
and that success stems from statutory provisions requiring
the EPA to implement a broad program according to a de18. See id. §§ 181(a)(1), 112(e)-(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7412(e)-().
19. See id §§ 202(g), 404(e), 604, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(g), 7651c(e), 7671c.
20. See i& § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
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tailed statutory timetable. 2 1 The toxics program has not enjoyed as much success as the programs where Congress wrote
the emissions limitations themselves.
The EPA has historically written its rules late and then
authorized illegally long delays in implementation. 22 Since
the 1990 CAAA contain detailed deadlines for a large number
of regulations, coupled with a "backstop provision" that subjects every source that should have been regulated to the individual permitting if the EPA fails to act, the EPA has
written more regulations than ever (albeit belatedly). 23 Because these regulations are numerous, typically demand
some reductions, and address such a broad group of air pollution sources, the last five years' of regulations will produce
more emission reductions than the previous two decades of
EPA effort in this area. However, most of these regulations
stop short of requiring all sources of pollution to even meet
the levels they can meet using widely available and proven
1970s and 1980s technology. 24 In addition, certain EPA regulations will have little or no effect in some communities because they represent steps backward, relative to the better
21. See id. §112 (a),(c),(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (a),(c),(e).
22. The Clean Air Act requires EPA to promulgate regulations addressing
forty categories of air pollution sources by 1992. See CAA §112; 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(e)(1). But the EPA's first hazardous air pollution rules fulfilling this
obligation came out years later. The EPA promulgated a final rule addressing
emissions from synthetic chemical manufacturing almost two years late and
continued to amend it through 1996, almost four years after the statutory deadline. See Direct Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1996); Final Rule for Synthetic
Chemical Manufacturing, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402 (1994). With respect to Petroleum Refineries, the EPA promulgated final rules in 1994 and it allowed some
polluters to comply long after the statutory compliance deadline. See 60 Fed.
Reg. 43,244, 43,247 (1995) (allowing compliance up to 10 years after promulgation) cf. CAA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(10),(i)(3) (requiring compliance within
three years of promulgation with a one year extension available under some
circumstances).
By contrast the EPA has moved rapidly to implement the law where Congress itself set the emission standards. See, e.g., Final Rule Implementing New
Light Duty Vehicle Standards, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,724 (1991).
23. See CAA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(j).
24. For example, the petroleum refinery rule required no reductions at all
from wastewater systems because the EPA declined to regulate sources of wastewater that it had not regulated in the past within petroleum refineries. See
60 Fed. Reg. at 43,246 (1995).
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efforts of state agencies addressing toxics. Indeed, they may
even lead to increased emissions in communities with very
large toxics problems. 25 The requirement that the EPA write
these regulations and that they provide for the maximum
achievable reductions, while not wholly successful, has produced more progress than we had prior to 1990 when debates
about the value of pursuing reductions usually supplanted
actual work on reducing emissions.
The lesson here is that congressional decisions to mandate broad reductions are very important and congressional
decisions specifying how much reduction and by whom are
even more important. Ironically, much of the regulatory reform effort seems devoted to abandoning congressional decision-making in this area. Instead of mandating reductions,
Congress would mandate a cost-benefit analysis if these bills
became law. 26 This would return us to a situation worse than
that vhich existed prior to the 1990 CAAA. Its prolonged debate about the costs and benefits of reductions in hazardous
air pollutants (HAPs) usually supplanted actions that would
actually reduce emissions and improve public health.2 7
Lesson Two: We Need to Better Enforce State
Obligations to Reduce Air Emissions
While progress has occurred, many states simply have
not implemented most of the programs that the CAA requires. Implementation failures have been most prominent
in Title I of the CAA, the Urban Smog Title. Absent strong
consistent enforcement of the states' obligations to provide
emissions reductions, the states have and will continue to
substitute the usual litany of excuses for not making the
tough choices required by the CAA. States do not want to
place themselves at a competitive disadvantage by regulating
25. The author has examined the plans for several large facilities in Louisiana which plan (basing this on the exemptions in federal standards) to increase

emissions from what state law might otherwise require.
26. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343,
104th Cong. § 623 (1995).
27. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 322 (1990); POWELL, supra
note 4, T 865.5A[4], at 79A-321.
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aggressively while its neighbors get away with not implementing the CAA. Since air quality modeling does not offer
precise answers to exactly what package of reductions will
work best, one can always delay by citing the need for more
air quality modeling. As the EPA fails to enforce the obligations of the most recalcitrant states obligation to actually deliver clean air, the better ones feel undermined and progress
slows across the board.
If states fail to act, the EPA is supposed to withhold highway funds or sanction the state by imposing federal restrictions on new sources. 28 The EPA, in practice, violates the law
regularly in order to avoid these politically difficult actions. 29
It may be worth thinking about a system that rewards states
for doing well instead of depending on politically difficult
punishment of those states who do badly. The states would
not receive highway monies unless, and until, they met CAA
obligations. States that met or exceeded the CAA's requirements would win that money. Non-performing states would
have to rely on state rather than federal funds. The current
system creates a kind of state entitlement to highway monies
which the EPA must withdraw in the case of non-compliance.
This entitlement seems terribly out of place in the 1990s. In
the meantime, though, the EPA must re-establish its credibility by consistently and regularly enforcing the CAA, politically difficult as this may be. Absent enforcement, we simply
will not get clean air.
Lesson Three:

Emissions Trading Can Work Well
When Coupled with Strict Rules and
Stringent Monitoring

In 1990, Congress limited each large power plant's sulfur
dioxide emissions and created an emissions trading program
28. See CAA § 179, 42 U.S.C. § 7509.
29. See, e.g., Memorandum from Mary Nichols, Assistant Administrator for
Air and Radiation to Regional Administrators (Mar. 2, 1995)(authorizing delay
in submitting a plan to meet air quality standards until 1997); cf.CAA § 181; 42
U.S.C.§ 7511a(c)(2)(A),(d),(e) (requiring serious severe and extreme areas to
submit attainment plans by November 15, 1994).
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based on these limitations.30 Under this Acid Rain Trading
Program, a power plant may emit more than Congress allows, but only if it purchases additional allowances from a
plant that emits less than Congress allows.
We are now in the first phase of a multi-phased trading
program, so we do not yet know whether the program has
succeeded. The recent decision to turn off acid rain monitors
in the Adirondack Mountains may make it impossible to
know whether this program ultimately succeeds in protecting
the environment. Early indications suggest that more reductions will be needed.
Many environmentalists, however, predict that this program will prove successful in at least realizing its own substantial emission reduction goals. Here are some of the
reasons. First, this program, unlike previous failed pro3
grams, relies on continuous monitoring of actual emissions. '
Unless the EPA's budget cuts prevent it from checking the
monitoring data, utilities will not be able to justify increased
emissions with reductions that only occurred on paper. Second, Congress set emissions limitations that provide for substantial reductions. Third, the rules do not seem to create
opportunities for gaming, a problem that has bedeviled previous EPA programs providing for trading between pollution
sources. We know that utilities operating under this program have reduced emissions at a tiny fraction of the costs
projected when Congress created this program in 1990.32

While the Zeitgeist3 3 leads many to conclude that emissions trading produces these cheap emission reductions, the
data does not support that conclusion. In fact, little trading
30. See POWELL, supra note 4.

31. See CAA § 412, 42 U.S.C. § 7651k.
32. See Martha M. Hamilton, Selling Pollution Rights Cuts the Cost of
CleanerAir, WASHNGTON POST, Aug. 24, 1994, at Fl. (utilities estimated that
acid rain reductions would cost $1500 per ton during debate on 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act); Comment & Analysis: An Innovation Gets Airborne, FiNANcLAL Tmms, May 6, 1996 at 17, (allowances now selling for $68.00
a ton).
33. "The taste and outlook characteristic of a period or generation." AbmuCAw HERTAGE DICTIONARY

1405 (2nd ed. 1982).
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has occurred.3 4 This suggests either that the EPA and industry simply exaggerated the cost of reductions when Congress
debated the 1990 CAAA or that companies can lower their
costs when faced with an affirmative obligation to meet a numerical limit. The reductions have generally involved no substantial innovation, but instead, an application of well known
and understood techniques. 35
So far, experience suggests the lesson that well designed
emissions trading programs are worthwhile, not because they
lower costs or stimulate innovation, but because of their ability to overcome political resistance to stringent emissions
limitations on industry by reducing the fear of high costs. 3 6

The EPA has encouraged state emissions trading programs
under Title I, the Urban Smog Title. This program may duplicate the failures of the 1980s, instead of using the lessons
of the 1990s about how to achieve success. Programs that do
not require reliable monitoring and eliminate the numerous
gaming opportunities that may arise, will solve a political
problem for the agencies, but they will do little or nothing to
protect the environment. Where reliable monitoring exists or
where equitable problems with redistributing pollution are
too great (for example, one cannot justify increasing some
people's cancer risk by pointing to overall declines in atmosphere loadings), the EPA must learn to 'just say no" to
trading.
Lesson Four: EPA Needs More Political Independence
It may be time for us to recognize that environmental
problems will require a politically independent agency devoted to solving them. The EPA is not such an agency. Many
34. See Casey Bukro, Smoke Trading is Thin; Emission Credits Produce
Little Heat, CHICAGO TRmBUNE, Feb. 6, 1995, at C1. The little trading that has
occurred may have lowered compliance costs for the purchasers of credits. But
the volume of trades has been so low that trading cannot explain the low costs.

Id.
35. These techniques consist chiefly of the use of low sulfur coal or
scrubbers.
36. It is possible that trading will pick up during phase two, when the program demands more stringent reductions. But this does not indicate that the
low costs to date stem from trading.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/6

8

1996]

FIVE LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT

59

of the implementation problems stem directly from political
pressure on the EPA. In particular, the EPA needs insulation from short term pressures to violate the law, coning
from Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
and the President.
OMB pressure has played a prominent role in the EPA's
failures. Pressure from the Bush White House led to an illegal initial permit rule and unnecessary delay and uncertainty
in the program.3 7 The initial permit program is crucial because, without an operating permit which collects the various
emissions limitations that apply to a facility, which applies
stringent monitoring requirements, and which describes how
a facility will comply, nobody has a ready way of determining
whether a plant is in compliance or not.3 8 While an in-

dependent EPA would be subject to pressures by polluters
trying to evade potential liability for non-compliance, an independent EPA would be more likely to respond to those
pressures on their merits rather than allow itself to be bludgeoned into violating the law.

37. The operating permit rule conflicts with section 502 of the Act, which
requires, inter alia, an opportunity for hearing and public comments when permits are revised. Compare CAA § 502; 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) with 40 C.F.R.
§ 70.7(e)(2)(h) (1992); Final Operating Permit Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 280-89
(1992). The original rule did not explicitly limit the emissions that might be
revised through so-called minor permit modifications, a procedure not involving
public comment. Instead, the EPA did exclude certain emission increasing activities from minor modification eligibility, but it apparently allowed emissions
increases that qualified as "minor new source review modifications," and increases not amounting to a modification under section 112(g) of the Act, without
seeking a permit revision requiring an opportunity for public participation. See
Operating Permits Program, Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,460, 44,462-63
(1994). In response to litigation, EPA has proposed amendments to many sections of the rules alleged to be illegal. See id.; 60 Fed. Reg. 45,530 (1995); see
also Chafee Voices ConcernAbout CAA PermitPlanAllowing Excess Emissions,
INSIDE EPA, May 3, 1991, at 8; Waxman Lambastes EPA CAA Permit Proposal
in Follow-up Hearing,INSME EPA, May 24, 1991, at 13; Bush Curbs CleanAir
Provision,WASHINGTON POST, May 17, 1992, at A-1.
38. See James Miskiewicsz and John S. Rudd, Civil and CriminalEnforcement of the Clean Air Act After the 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVrL. L. REv.
281 (1992); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129
U. PA. L. REv. 1059, 1071-93 (1981); POWELL, supra note 4, 865.5A[7] at 79A330.14.
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While the problems in the permit program stem primarily from the Bush Administration, politicization of implementation is a bipartisan problem. President Clinton
undermined the EPA enforcement of the Enhanced Vehicle
Inspection and Maintenance Program (I&M), one of the simplest and cheapest ways to realize large emission reductions,
at a critical juncture by not enforcing the program in California, an important electoral state.39 Congressional pressure
has pushed the EPA into further backtracking on this program among others. The Clinton Administration has also
continued to allow the OMB to oversee the EPA rulemaking,
thus continuing the Republican tradition of undermining
40
implementation.
In other areas, where short term political pressures could
prevent an agency from carrying out important long-term
missions in a consistent manner, we insulate the agency from
political pressures from elected officials through devices other
than modifications in the law. Maybe we should look at models like the Federal Reserve Board and think about long term
appointments for the heads of the EPA with limited removal
authority.
Lesson V:

Environmental Protection Generates
Employment

The fifth lesson is that environmental protection usually
tends to generate employment. Much of the data for this observation actually predates the 1990 CAAA, but writers have
39. Early in President Clinton's first term, most states had moved forward
in adopting enhanced vehicle inspection and maintenance programs meeting
the EPA's requirements under the 1990 Amendments. These programs separate the testing from the repair of vehicles and enhance the testing equipment
to assure that vehicles with excess emissions are identified and repaired properly. California, however, was refusing to adopt the required program. EPA
threatened to impose sanctions. But EPA reneged on this threat, apparently

because of White House pressure. EPA subsequently undermined the better
states by negotiating a deal to accept a California program that seemed not to
comply with the rule. Subsequently, most states that had planned to adopt a
separation of test and repair dropped these programs.
40. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
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recently been pulling the newer data together. 41 Environmental protection tends to generate blue collar employment,
which may explain why employers resist stringent environmental protection.42 Some companies would much rather fire
their workers and enjoy larger profits than hire more workers
to run an environmentally excellent business. Data from the
late 1980s shows that the number of layoffs caused by environmental protection is less than one-tenth of one percent of
all large scale layoffs from that period. 43 Mergers, however,
were a leading cause of unemployment, as they seem to be
today." Overall, environmental protection has generated a
small net increase in jobs.
Conclusion
In sum, the experience of CAA implementation, to date,
suggests that specific congressional decisions help clean the
air, that better enforcement of state obligations is needed,
that emissions trading probably can work well when coupled
with stringent monitoring and game proof rules (but not
otherwise), that the EPA needs more political independence,
and that environmental protection generates employment.
These simple lessons may have relevance beyond the CAA.
While these lessons are simple, responding appropriately
to these lessons is very difficult. Even if we were focused on
learning from our experience in order to better clean the air,
we would have a set of formidable political and intellectual
challenges to meet to translate these lessons into practice.
Unfortunately, the so-called "regulatory reform" debate
in Washington, which drives implementation to some degree,
does not focus on the real lessons that one can draw from
actual experience. Indeed, many of the "regulatory reform"
proposals would interfere with duplication of recent successes
41. See E.B. GOODSTEIN,
TioNAL TRADE-OFF (1994).

JoBs

AND THE

EvmmomtErr: THE MYTH

OF A

NA-

42. See id. at 1.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 14 (ownership changes accounted for 40 times more layoffs
than environmental protection costs).
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and promote duplication of previous failures.
unfortunate.
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